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A PRIMER OF UNIT DESIGN UNDER OHIO'S
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING STATUTE
Jack Grant Day*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Collective bargaining does not begin under the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (Act)' until at least these three elements are in place:
(1) an exclusive representative for public employees;'
(2) certified by the State Employment Relations Board (Board
or SERB) after a choice by a majority of the employees voting freely
and without employer or employee organization interference, restraint
or coercion; 8
(3) in a unit that is appropriate in the light of the permissives
and prohibitions of the law.'
With an assurance founded on total ignorance of what architecChairman, State Employment Relations Board. Judge, Ohio Court of Appeals for the
Eighth District, 1968-1984. B.S., Ohio State University, 1935; L.L.B., Ohio State University,
1938; M.A., Ohio State University, 1940. 1 acknowledge the contributions to this paper by my
colleagues on the Ohio State Employment Relations Board. Both Vice Chairman William P.
Sheehan and Member Helen H. Fix read the manuscript critically and, of course, contributed
substantially to the case material which forms part of the analysis. Executive Director Kenneth
W. Barrett, General Counsel Jacqueline F. Davis, and Assistant General Counsel John E. Schiller
made important suggestions helping to save me from myself. Finally, I am indebted to Professor
Andria S. Knapp, Hastings College of Law, for her expert critical review. All of these benefactors
are absolved from any vices lurking in the piece. These belong entirely to me.
I. Act of July 6, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-238 to -246 (Baldwin) (codified at
Otno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Page Supp. 1984)). The right to bargain collectively is
guaranteed only to a "public employee" as defined in the Act. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
4117.03(A)(l)-(5) (Page Supp. 1984). See also id. § 4117.01(C) (definition of "public employee"). This does not mean that a public employer is forbidden to bargain with those public
employees not covered by the definition, such as supervisors. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Such employees simply lack public employee status for the purpose of compelled collective bargaining.
2. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.04-05 (Page Supp. 1984).
3. Id. § 4117.07.
4. See id. § 4117.06. See also infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
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tural license will permit, one can say that the Ohio public sector collective bargaining arch has several keystones. The appropriate unit designation is certainly one of them and will be the primary concern of this
article. It will focus on the importance of the appropriate unit designation, statutory directives and limitations on unit designations, SERB
policy, and the process by which clarifications of unit designations or
amendments are made.

II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT TO THE
CERTIFICATION PROCESS

A principal responsibility of SERB is the oversight of the statutory
procedures established to provide, among other things, that public employees have an untrammelled opportunity5 to declare (in an appropriate unit) for or against collective bargaining representation.' The Act
provides three methods by which an employee organization can be certified. First, it will be certified if it is selected as representative by a
majority of voting employees voting in an appropriate unit.7 Second,
certification of a bargaining representative without a vote may be imposed when circumstances indicate that majority support for a union in
an appropriate unit has been dissipated by employer unfair labor practices.' A third method for acquiring employee organization certification
is available when the statutory conditions for voluntary recognition are
satisfied.9
It is readily apparent that every method for achieving certification
implicates a unit determination, for the appropriateness of the unit is
an integral, interwoven, and indispensible element in selecting an exclusive representative. 10 In the first place, the unit fixes the perimeters of
the voting constituency which will decide whether there will be an exclusive representative. In the second, it establishes the categories (clas-

5. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11 (A)-(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
6. See id. §§ 4117.03-.07, 4117.11(A)-(B).
7. Id. § 4117.05(A)(1).
8. Subsection 4117.07(A)(2) provides in part:
The board may . . . certify an employee organization as an exclusive representative if it
determines that a free and untrammelled election cannot be conducted because of the employer's unfair labor practices and that at one time the employee organization had the
support of the majority of the employees in the unit.
Id. § 4117.07(A)(2).
9. Id. §§ 4117.05(A)(2)(a)-(b), 4117.07(A)(2). See also Franklin Local School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., I OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 1308, at VII-234 to -235 (Nov. 7, 1984). See
generally Sharpe, Proof of Non-Interest in Representation Disputes: A Burden Without Reason,
II U. DAYTON L. REV. 3 (1985) (extensive discussion of voluntary recognition procedures).
10. The "bargaining unit" or "appropriate unit" is a recurring concern throughout the sections of the Act governing certifications. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.04-07
(Page Supp. 1984).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/2

A PRIMER OF UNIT DESIGN

19861

sifications) of employees to which bargaining rights accrue. The bargaining unit describes the "physical geography" of collective
bargaining. It is for those persons within the unit environment that employers and certified employee organizations must seek a contract setting terms and conditions of employment.
III. THE STATUTORY DIRECTIVES
The Act directs SERB to consider seven explicit factors in determining the unit appropriate for bargaining.11 This direction, however,
is not inflexible. SERB retains a great deal of discretion. The directions
to consider particular factors are1 softened (1) by the qualifying phrase
"among other relevant factors"; 2 (2) by a separate section providing
that the Board may find one unit appropriate even though another unit
may also be;" and (3) by a specific disavowal of any prohibition
against multiunit bargaining. 4 When the rather nebulous quality of
the factors which the Board "shall consider" are coupled with the areas
of discretion, it is clear that the Board is far from tightly corsetted in
unit design. Even when bargaining units of certain combinations of job
classifications are proscribed by law, many, if not all, ill effects of the
proscription can be avoided if the parties agree on multiunit
bargaining.15
IV.

STATUTORY LIMITs ON UNIT DESIGN

SERB determinations of appropriate units are final, conclusive,
and not appealable. 1 ' In fact, however, unit determinations can be reviewed by courts. This can happen only when a refusal to bargain,
based on opposition to the unit configuration, is followed by a finding of7
an unfair labor practice and a corrective order. Then, if court action'
Subsection 4117.06(B) states:
The board shall determine the appropriateness of each bargaining unit and shall consider among other relevant factors: the desires of the employees; the community of interest;
wages, hours, and other working conditions of the public employees; the effect of overfragmentation; the efficiency of operations of the public employer; the administrative structure of the public employer, and the history of collective bargaining.
Id. § 4117.06(B). Obviously, the appropriateness of a unit is the prime consideration in its design.
12. Id. In Northwest Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., I Omuo PuB. EMPLOYEE REP.(LRP)
1279 (Oct. 25, 1984), the statutory requirements were characterized as "not a corset but a guide."
Id. at Vl1-209.
13. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(C) (Page Supp. 1984).
14. The last sentence in § 4117.06(D)(6) states: "This section [listing prohibitions on unit
design] shall not be deemed to prohibit multiunit bargaining." Id. § 4117.06(D)(6). "Section"
must refer to all of § 4117.06. This is so because the divisions of that section, (A)-(D), are
subsections.
IS. Id. I 4117.06(D)(6).
16. Id. § 4117.06(A).
17. See id. § 4117.13(A). (D).
11.
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is taken to enforce or review the order, review of the unit composition
may follow. Conceivably, under this process, the court may modify a
unit wrought by SERB.
The Act imposes some limits on the Board's authority to determine units. The most rigid involve job classifications which are not to
be joined in the same unit with other job classifications in any case 8 or
which may not be joined unless specified procedural requisites are
met."9
Definitional subsections 4117.01(A), (B), (C), (F), (I), (J), (K),
(N), and (0) have special relevance to unit design because the unit
composition depends in part on elements these subsections define.
These include descriptions of:
(1) a public employer who must bargain collectively with an exclusive, designated representative of public employees;2"
(2) a public employee who has a right to bargain collectively;2
(3) employees of private contractors who may be public employees under specified circumstances;2 2 and
(4) the details defining various categories of employees not
2
deemed public employees under the Act.
A.

Design Prohibitions

The principal source of prohibited joinders is subsection
4117.06(D). That subsection, in subdivisions (2), (3), (4), and (6),
flatly proscribes a unit appropriate that:
(a) combines "other employees" with (1) "guards or corrections
officers at penal or mental institutions," (2) special police "appointed in
accordance with sections 5119.14 and 5123.13 of the Revised Code,"
(3) "psychiatric attendants employed at mental health forensic facilities," (4) "youth leaders employed at juvenile correction facilities," or
(5) "any public employee employed as a guard to enforce against other
employees rules to protect property of the employer or . . .the safety
of persons on the employer's premises . ..";4
(b) combines members of a police or fire department, or the state

18. See, e.g., id.§ 4117.06(D)(3) (prohibits inclusion of "members of police or fire departments . . . in a unit with other classifications of public employees of the department").
19. See, e.g., id. § 4117.06(D)(1) (prohibits inclusion of both professional and nonprofessional employees in the same unit unless a majority of each classification votes for such inclusion).
20. Id. §§ 4117.01(B), 4117.04(A)-(B).
21. Id. §§ 4117.01(C), 4117.03(A). Subsection 4117.01(C) lists 14 categories of exceptions
to public employee status. See id. § 4117.01(C). For a listing of these .exceptions, see infra note
39.
22. Id. § 4117.01(C).
23. Id. §§ 4117.01(F), (I)-(K), (M)-(O).
24. Id. § 4117.06(D)(2).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/2
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highway patrol,
with "other classifications of public employees of the
2
department"; 5
(c) combines "rank and file" members of a police department
"with members who are of the rank of sergeant or above" ;26

(d) "designates as appropriate a bargaining unit that contains
more than one institution of higher education" ;27 or
(e) designates as appropriate a unit "within any . . . institution
of higher education" that "would be inconsistent with the accreditation
standards or interpretations of such standards, governing such institutions of higher education or any department, school, or college
28
thereof."
In subdivisions 4117.06(D)(1) and (5), the proscriptions are not
flat but prescribe procedural hurdles which must be cleared before
combinations are permitted. Thus the Board may not decide that a unit
is appropriate when:
(1) the unit combines professional and nonprofessional employees
unless a majority of each class "first vote for inclusion in the unit";21 or
(2) the unit combines classifications of employees "within the jurisdiction of more than one elected county office holder" unless the
"county-elected" office holder and the county commissioners agree to

25. Id. § 4117.06(D)(3). Query, whether "other classifications of public employees" not in
the police or fire departments or highway patrol could be combined in a unit with policemen,
firemen, or highway patrol officers if the other elements of appropriateness (e.g., § 4117.06(B))
were present? Is it conceivable that police, fire, and highway patrol classifications could be combined in a state horizontal unit? In its purest form a horizontal unit is one that combines the same
or similar classifications from a variety of agencies.
26. Id. § 4117.06(D)(6).
27. Id. § 4117.06(D)(4). Units are "almost" universally defined in the Act by aggregations
of jobs rather than by a collection of employers (e.g., institutions). For this reason, it is assumed
that in this subsection the legislature must have intended that there be no units (composed of
whatever job classifications) bridging the boundaries between educational institutions. For the
warrant of the caveat "almost," see id. § 4117.06(D)(5). Under that subdivision a unit composed
of employees of several county officials is possible. This condition does not determine inclusions
and exclusions of particular job classifications, but it does make a grouping of employers a factor
in the design.
28. Id. § 4117.06(D)(4)(emphasis added). Under this subdivision "any branch or regional
campus of a public institution of higher education" belongs to the parent institution. Id.
29. Id. § 4117.06(D)(1). Professional employees are defined in § 4117.01(I):
"Professional employee" means any employee engaged in work which is predominantly
intellectual, involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance
and requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily
acquired by a prolonged course in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship; or an employee who
has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and is performing related
work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee.
Id. § 4117.01(l).
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the combination."

The temporary law, specifically subsections 4(A), (B), and (E), 1
provides for a transfer forward of exclusive recognition established
under contracts, agreements, memoranda of understanding, "or otherwise" from the period before April 1, 1984, a3 into the statutory era
which follows that date. Subsection 4(A) has fixed the life expectancy
of written agreements, contracts, or understandings resulting from such
recognition at three years by incorporating the time limits of subsection
4117.05(B).3 3 However, the time limit cuts down only the life of the
contract bar defense." The employee organization recognized under
subsections 4(A) and (B) of the temporary law is "deemed certified"
and continues to be so until successful challenge by a rival organization
followed by SERB certification.88 The principal effect for unit determination is a virtual freeze (not total) of the "deemed certified" units
absent successful challenge.3 6

30. Id. § 4117.06(D)(5).
31. See Act of July 6, 1983, § 4(A)-(B), (E), 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin). Temporary or special laws are not assigned Revised Code section numbers.
Only laws that are of a general and permanent nature are assigned Revised Code
section numbers. Other laws that are of a temporary or special nature are not codified.
Usually, a law is considered to be temporary if it will be in existence for less than three
years; and is considered to be special if it deals with a subject, such as a conveyance of
state property, that does not have general application.
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, BILL DRAFTING MANUAL (4th ed. 1977).
32. While the effective date of the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act was
October 6, 1983, substantive provisions dealing with recognition, bargaining, impasse resolution,
and strikes did not become effective until April 1, 1984. Act of July 6, 1983, § 3. 1983 Ohio
Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
33. Subsection 4117.05(B) provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a public employer to recognize, or
the state employment relations board to certify, an employee organization as an exclusive
representative under Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code if there is in effect a lawful written agreement, contract, or memorandum of understanding between the public employer
and another employee organization which, on the effective date of this section, has been
recognized by a public employer as the exclusive representative of the employees in a unit
or which by tradition, custom, practice, election, or negotiation has been the only employee
organization representing all employees in the unit; this restriction does not apply to that
period of time covered by any agreement which exceeds three years. For the purposes of
this section, extensions of agreement do not affect the expiration of the original agreement.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(B) (Page Supp. 1984). Subsection 4117.09(D) prohibits any
contract for a period exceeding three years. See id. § 4117.09(D). This section applies to contracts
negotiated after the effective date of the Act and affects the contract bar defense.
34. The contract bar defense rule requires that no election be held during the term of a
collective bargaining agreement. See id.§ 4117.07(C)(6).
35. The temporary law, § 4(A)-(B), does not address the eventuality of decertification.See
Act of July 6, 1983, § 4(A)-(B), 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245 (Baldwin).
36. See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
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Permissible Designs

Only public employees as defined in the Act have mandated collective bargaining rights.3 7 The definition of "public employee" is short
and obvious" but is followed immediately by fourteen exceptions.3 9
Employees in the excepted categories have no bargaining "rights" but
that does not mean that public employers are prohibited from bargaining with representatives of the excepted employees; public employers
may elect to bargain. They are not compelled to do so. The Act is quite
clear on this proposition:
Nothing in Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code prohibits public employers from electing to engage in collective bargaining, meet and confer
[sic], discussions, or any other form of collective negotiations with public
employees who are not subject to Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code

37. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01(C), 4117.03(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
38. Subsection 4117.01(C) defines "public employee" to mean:
[A]ny person holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public
employer, including any person working pursuant to a contract between a public employer
and a private employer and over whom the national labor relations board has declined
jurisdiction on the basis that the involved employees are employees of a public employer
Id. § 4117.01(C). Fourteen exceptions follow the above definition. Id. For a listing of these exceptions, see infra note 39.
39. The following employees are excepted from the general definition of "public employee":
(I) Persons holding elective office;
(2) Employees of the general assembly and employees of any other legislative body
of the public employer whose principal duties are directly related to the legislative functions of the body;
(3) Employees on the staff of the governor or the chief executive of the public employer whose principal duties are directly related to the performance of the executive functions of the governor or the chief executive;
(4) Persons who are members of the organized militia, while on active duty;
(5) Employees of the state employment relations board;
(6) Confidential employees;
(7) Management level employees;
(8) Employees and officers of the courts, assistants to the attorney general, assistant
prosecuting attorneys, and employees of the clerks of courts who perform a judicial
function;
(9) Employees of a public official who act in a fiduciary capacity, appointed pursuant
to section 124.11 of the Revised Code;
(10) Supervisors;
(1I)
Students whose primary purpose is educational training, including graduate assistants or associates, residents, interns, or other students working as part-time public employees less than fifty per cent of the normal year in the employee's bargaining unit;
Employees of county boards of election;
(12)
(13) Seasonal and casual employees as determined by the state employment relations
board;
(14) Part-time faculty members of an institution of higher education.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 4117.01(C) (Page Supp. 1984).
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pursuant to division (C) of section 4117.01 of the Revised Code.4 0
Following the statute's lead, the Board has approved a stipulated
unit (i.e., mutually agreed) for a consent election which included both
supervisors and rank and file workers." And it has certified a unit including an employee with whom the employer had the right to refuse to
bargain but had waived the right.' The theory underlying the Act and
these decisions has been examined and approved by the Ohio Supreme
Court.'3
This body of doctrine provides extraordinary flexibility for the parties to mark out bargaining territory on their own terms without an
override by the Board. Such flexibility comports with the conventional
labor relations wisdom that parties can generally bargain terms more
sensitive to their particular requirements than a third party (e.g., government) could decide for them."
Flexibility does not mean that unit design using permissive classifications is easy. Even assuming agreement to the unit, if SERB certification is sought, great care is required in describing the very complex
permissive categories. And pains must be taken to prevent illicit combinations between permissive and prohibited categories. Some units
seeming to incorporate classifications that are only permissive may be
legally acceptable despite employer opposition. This possibility exists
because some general exceptions are themselves subject to exceptions.
This condition makes the formulation of permissible unit conclusions
almost as difficult as it is reputed to be "to make one's way to Zen."
To illustrate the involutions in the exceptions, and the difficulty in
managing them, consider one exception-that for supervisors. The single word, "supervisors," totally describes the tenth exception to the

40. Id. § 4117.03(C).
41. See City of Canton, 2 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 2439 (Mar. 27, 1985).
42. See City of Loveland, 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 2630, at VII-435 to -436
(May 30, 1985).
43. See State ex rel. Ohio Council 8 v. Spellacy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 112, 114-15, 478 N.E.2d
229, 231-32 (1985).
44. Query, what would the consequences be if the parties mutually agreed on a unit combination which included both prohibited categories and either compelled bargaining categories (i.e.,
categories with a right to bargain) and/or permissive ones? Certainly SERB could not certify
such a unit. Could or should SERB intervene to devise a legal modification? If SERB did not or
could not, is there any entity that has standing to challenge the combination? For an example of
the Board's efforts to accommodate agreements for units not possible as singles but legal in a
series, see infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. In such situations, if an objective is unified
bargaining, it can be legally achieved by dissolving and recombining to eliminate prohibitions
before resorting to multiunit bargaining. See supra note 14. If parties have agreed to a unit of
illicit combinations and complete a bargain for the unit without reference to SERB, can either
party secure a judicial order to enforce a collective bargaining contract when and if enforcement
implicates classifications in the nonconforming unit?
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general definition for "public employees" in subsection 4117.01(C). 5
Then subsection 4117.01 (F) attempts a more detailed description of the
duties to establish the statutory characteristics of supervisory work."
Four subdivisions follow. Each in sequence subtracts a classification
from a defined class by an explicit exception for "employees of school
districts who are department chairmen or consulting teachers, 4 7 adds
a descriptive subdivision to the definition for members of police and fire
departments," eliminates specified job elements as the sole test for su45. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(C)(10) (Page Supp. 1984).
46. Subsection 4117.01(F) provides:
"Supervisor" means any individual who has authority, in the interest of the public
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other public employees; to responsibly direct them; to adjust their grievances; or
to effectively recommend such action, if the exercise of that authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgment ....
Id. § 4117.01(F).
47. "Employees of school districts .who are department chairmen or consulting teachers
shall not be deemed supervisors .... " Id. § 4117.01(F)(1) (emphasis added). This means that
employees in the classifications or categories specifically mentioned are public employees with the
bargaining rights which accompany that status. For comparison, § 4117.01(F)(3) provides:
With respect to faculty members of a state institution of higher education, heads of
departments or divisions are supervisors; however, no other faculty member or group of
faculty members is a supervisor solely because the faculty member or group of faculty
members participate in decisions with respect to courses, curriculum, personnel, or other
matters of academic policy ....
Id. § 4117.01(F)(3). Note that heads of departments or divisions arc specifically denominated
supervisors, while employees with duties seemingly supervisory are not to be so deemed solely
because those duties are performed.
Unless labels are to be substituted for actuality, it is obvious that exclusions of "heads of
departments or divisions" will require some interpretation. The same must be said for deciding
when, if ever, a faculty member or group of faculty members perform duties bringing them within
the supervisory exclusion.
48. Id. § 4117.01(F)(2). This subsection first narrows the definition of supervisors and then
expands it by incorporating the effects of any judicial decision confirming an employer's right to
refuse to bargain with certain members of a police or fire department on the ground that they are
supervisors. Specifically, § 4117.01(F)(2) provides:
With respect to members of a police or fire department, no person shall be deemed a
supervisor except the chief of the department or those individuals who, in the absence of
the chief, are authorized to exercise the authority and perform the duties of the chief of the
department. Where prior to June 1,1982, a public employer pursuant to a judicial decision
rendered in litigation to which the public employer was a party, has declined to engage in
collective bargaining with members of a police or fire department on the basis that such
members are supervisors, those members of a police or fire department do not have the
rights specified in Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code for the purposes of future collective
bargaining. The state employment relations board shall decide all disputes concerning the
application of this division.
Id. (emphasis added). The city of Dayton had been the only public employer that fell within the
"judicial decision" exception to § 4117.01(F)(2). For background, see Fraternal Order of Police
Lodge 44 v. City of Dayton, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2276 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1978); Beavers v.
City of Dayton, No. 79-3177 (Ohio C.P. Ct., Montgomery County 1980); Fraternal Order
of Police v. Dayton, 96 L.R.R.M (BNA) 2975 (Ohio C.P. Ct., Montgomery County 1977); Fraternal Orderby
ofeCommons,
Police v. Dayton,
92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3559 (Ohio C.P. Ct., Montgomery County
Published
1985
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pervisory status in "a state institution of higher education," 4" and finally identifies a series of conditions necessary to the designation of
"teachers" as supervisors or management level employees."0 This does
not exhaust the possible examples of definitional complexity.
Such imposed difficulty has created challenges. It has not made
adequate and practical unit design impossible.
V.

UNIT DESIGN-SERB POLICY

The Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (Act)"
places on SERB the specific obligation to "decide in each case the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining." ' The admonition is repeated and coupled with standards which must be taken into
account, "among other relevant factors," in determining appropriate
units.53 The legislature recognized the importance of flexibility in design by not compelling exclusive consideration of the factors specified
and by providing that the Board could find a particular unit to be appropriate even though another might also be." An additional element
of discretion was implied by the direct specification that the prohibition
of units with certain features" was not intended to prohibit multiunit
bargaining.5 6
These sections coupled with the general injunction in subsection
4117.02(H)(8) to "[p]romulgate, amend, and rescind rules and procedures and exercise other powers appropriate to carry out Chapter 4117

1976); Lodge 44 v. City of Dayton, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3429 (Ohio.C.P. Ct., Montgomery
County 1974).
SERB had declined to decide that the special exception for judicially determined supervisors
violated constitutional equal protection on the primary ground that the Board lacked authority to
emasculate its own charter. See City of Dayton, I OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 1381, at
VII-276 to -277 (Nov. 20, 1984). In State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police v. State
Employment Relations Bd., 22 Ohio St. 3d 1,N.E.2d (1986), the Ohio Supreme Court
held the "judicial exception" to be unconstitutional as it violated the equal protection guarantees
of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Id. at 6-7, N.E.2d at _ . The supreme
court also held that the provision violated the Ohio Constitution because it did not have a uniform
operation throughout the state of Ohio. Id. at 7, N.E.2d at _ .
49. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(F)(3) (Page Supp. 1984). See also supra notes
46-47.
50. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(F)(4) (Page Supp. 1984).
51. Act of July 6, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-238 to -246 (Baldwin) (codified at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Page Supp. 1984)).

52. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(A) (Page Supp. 1984).
53. See id. § 4117.06(B). See also supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
54. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.06(C) (Page Supp. 1984). This subsection provides:
"The board may determine a unit to be the appropriate unit in a particular case, even though
some other unit might also be appropriate." Id.
55. See id. § 4117.06(D)(!)-(6).
56. See supra note 14.
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of the Revised Code"' 7 provide the power auspice for the Board's creative efforts in unit design. Exercise of the power has been case-by-case.
It has been done gingerly and with a great deal of attention in order to
achieve legal units, to take account of practical considerations, and, so
far as possible, to effect the desires of the parties when they are in
agreement on the unit configuration."
A. Units Combining Striking and Non-Striking Categories-The
Reading Principle

The Act prohibits strike action for certain specified classifications
of public employees.5 It permits limited job action by many others."
The joinder of some employee categories in the same bargaining unit
with others is absolutely forbidden.61 However, there is no statutory
provision which makes the strike prohibition or its absence the litmus
for permitting the joinder of classifications in the same bargaining unit.

For example, dispatchers for police and fire departments are prohibited
from striking, s but nowhere in the Act is there a proscription against
combining dispatchers in units with classifications of employees who
may strike solely because of the job action permissibility.
However, a dichotomy of right within the same economic unit creates the possibility that at some point in negotiations one fragment of
the unit will be preparing to strike while the other has no choice but
arbitration. This difference in tactical choices may develop internal
friction. If one imagines the worst possible scenario, one fragment will
succeed differently from the other, in which case there will always be a
perception of a better and worse bargaining achievement with resulting
dissatisfaction by the fragment that conceives that it has fared badly.
Moreover, strike action has infectious aspects. If a legal strike produces
57. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02(H)(8) (Page Supp. 1984).
58. Procedural faults may prevent the Board's honoring the parties' unit agreement. For
example, in Southern State Community College, I Omo Pun. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) T 1512
(Dec. 21, 1984), the union filed for voluntary recognition in a particular unit. The employer made
a defensive response asking for a representation election under § 4117.05(B)(1), claiming that an
issue of representation existed. After a hearing on that issue, pursuant to § 4117.07(A)(2), it was
determined that no real issue existed and the original unit requested was certified. Id. at VII-343.
In the interim the parties had agreed on a slightly modified unit which could not be certified for
exclusive recognition because the modified unit had not had the statutory posting necessary to
qualify for voluntary recognition. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a) (Page Supp.
1984). If the parties had satisfied a new posting, certification would have been proper for the
modified agreed unit.
59. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Page Supp. 1984). For example, members
of police departments are prohibited from striking and instead must settle bargaining disputes
through the use of settlement and arbitration proceedings. Id.
60. Id. I 4117.14(D)(2).
61. Id. J 4117.06(D)(2)-(4), (6). See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
62. Omo REv. CODE ANN. I 4117.14(D)(1) (Page Supp. 1984).
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what is perceived as a favorable result, a contagion might induce illegal
action by those unit members who have no right to strike. One may
presume that the public employer will not view employee disgruntlement as an asset and may fairly anticipate unwanted pressure to correct whatever is seen as an inequity by a fraction of the unit. This
condition is not apt to promote the labor relations tranquility for which
the Act aims.
SERB has never specifically endorsed all of this rationale. However, in City of Reading,"5 the parties proposed and the Board approved a unit of police dispatchers (non-strike employees) and a single
clerk (strike-permissible employee). The justification for the action was
narrowly confined. A short opinion explained that the inclusion of a
clerk, who could legally strike, in a unit with dispatchers, who could
not, was done "to satisfy both the collective representation policy of the
statute and its complementary policy against overfragmentation
.... "" The Board explicitly disavowed the decision "as a precedent
for the same action in every case," noting: "A different context may
warrant, even demand, a different result." '
It is significant that the "context" for the Reading decision included only a single strike-qualified clerk and two strike-proscribed dispatchers. Thus, the case can be seen as a practical disposition respecting the parties desire not to divide an already tiny unit. Moreover, the
size of the unit and the split of power portends an insignificant capacity
for an illicit job action.6"
Several cases have followed the Reading combination, in principle,
but typically in small units in which the employees in classifications
with the right to strike were a minority. 67 Part of the rationale seems to
be that smaller units pose the over-fragmentation problem in a particularly severe form.6 8 Another premise, though unstated, may be that the

63. 1 OHIo PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 1140 (Aug. 22, 1984).
64. Id. at VII-92.
65. Id. Query, what result if one category in the combination (i.e., striking and non-striking) claimed a breach of the duty of fair representation because the bargaining achieved disparate
results for the respective categories?
66. Very severe penalties may be assessed for participation in an illegal strike. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. J 4117.23(A)-(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
67. See, e.g.. Perry County Sheriff, I OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 1497 (Dec. 12,
1984) (unit of seven-SERB files indicate the unit included four dispatchers with no right to
strike); Clearcreek Township Trustees, I OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 1189 (Sept. 26,
1984) (unit included one clerk with the right to strike). Large units with larger numbers of employees in the striking and non-striking categories would certainly pose the "combination" issue
differently. One or two disparities are not apt to affect unit action. Larger numbers would almost
certainly cause a conflict.
68. See Perry County Sheriff, I OHIO PB. EMPLOYEE REP (LRP)
1497, at VII-337.
("[S]even-member unit is appropriate because requiring a separate unit of dispatchers would crehttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/2
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dominant "no strike" group will determine and control the unit's economic tactic and final impasse will be resolved by conciliation
(arbitration).
B.

"Reformed" Consent-The Warren County Sheriff Case

There are instances in which parties have consented to elections in
agreed units which joined classifications or categories in forbidden combinations. When that occurred in the consent election agreement in
Warren County Sheriff," the Board recast the unit into two units with
inclusions and exclusions reflecting combinations permitted under the
Act.70 Also involved was the application of a reasonable gloss to existing definitions to accomplish a licit joinder of classifications in the
units approved. This technique, not quite a reformation, provides a
method for effecting the parties' unit agreement without doing violence
to the intent of the law.
The gloss method has been used by the Board when a definitional
patina is rational, based on a tenable premise, and either effects or does
not do violence to the unit intent of consenting parties."' This mode was
ate problems of overfragmentation.").
69. Warren County Sheriff, 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 2553, at VII-316 to -318
(Apr. 24, 1985) (opinion was amended sua sponte under the same style on July 11, 1985; the
amendment did not affect the unit design point for which the case is cited).
70. Elections were directed in the following units:
Unit I
Included: All full-time deputized employees, including: deputized dispatchers; deputized court officers; deputy road patrol; deputized transportation officers; deputized complaint takers; deputized correction officers;' deputized detectives; and deputized patrol
corporal.
Excluded: Nondeputized dispatchers, nondeputized control officers, nondeputized complaint taker, nondeputized correction officer/cook, nondeputized custodial worker; all other
personnel.
Unit 2
Included: All nondeputized employees, including nondeputized dispatcher, nondeputized control officer, nondeputized complaint taker, nondeputized correction officer/cook,'
and nondeputized custodial worker.
Excluded: All deputized employees; all other employees.
1. By deputizing correction officers they may be properly classified as within
O.R.C. 4117.01(M) [defining "member" of a police department].
2. Correction officers employed by a sheriff's department are not "correction
officers at penal or mental institutions" subject to the exclusive unit restrictions of
Ohio Revised Code Section 4117.06(D)(2). Nondeputized correction officers and
nondeputized dispatchers are properly included in one unit because both are prohib-

ited from striking. [See OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

4117.14(D)(I) (Page Supp. 1984)].

Other non-deputized employees who have the right to strike are included in the
same unit under the principle articulated in City of Reading .... [I OHIO PUB.
EMPLOYEE REP.

(LRP)

1140 (Aug. 22, 1984)].

Warren County Sheriff, 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 2553, at VII-317.
71. It is conceivable that parties' adversary positions (as distinguished from consensual positions) on unit inclusions and exclusions could be resolved by the definitional method. However, the

Published by eCommons, 1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 1 1:2

adopted in two different ways in the Warren County Sheriff case. In
the first instance, deputized corrections officers were distinguished from
non-deputized corrections officers.72 Characterized as "deputized," the
corrections officers were brought within a portion of subsection
4117.01(M) defining "member of police department, '78 thus legitimiz-

ing their joinder in a unit with other "police" members without violating the prohibition against "police member" and "non-police member"

combinations.74
In addition, definitional license permitted a determination that the
corrections officers in the sheriff's department were not "corrections officers at penal or mental institutions. ' 7' Therefore, such officers were
outside the combining proscriptions of subsection 4117.06(D)(2). 76
VI.

PETITIONS TO CLARIFY OR TO AMEND EXISTING BARGAINING

UNITS

A.

The Code Rule

Before the effective date of chapter 4117, emergency Ohio Administrative Code Rule 4117-5-0177 was promulgated. A permanent rule
replaced it on June 24, 1984, and provided in subsection (C):
In the absence of a question of representation, a petition for clarification of an existing bargaining unit or for amendment of the certifica-

problem has not reached the Board in an adversary context.
72. See supra note 70 (footnote I of Warren County Sherifi).
73. Subsection 4117.01(M) provides:
"Member of a police department" means a person who is in the employ of a police
department of a municipal corporation as a full-time regular policeman or policewoman as
the result of an appointment from a duly established civil service eligibility list or under
section 737.15 or 737.16 of the Revised Code, or a full-time deputy sheriff appointed
under section 311.04 of the Revised Code, or a township constable appointed under section
509.01 of the Revised Code, or a member of a township police district police department
appointed under section 505.49 of the Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(M) (Page Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
74. See id. § 4117.06(D)(3).
75. Pursuant to § 4117.06(D)(2), the Board may not:
Include guards or correction officers at penal or mental institutions, special policemen
or policewomen appointed in accordance with sections 5119.14 and 5123.13 of the Revised
Code, psychiatric attendants employed at mental health forensic facilities, youth leaders
employed at juvenile correction facilities, or any public employee employed as a guard to
enforce against other employees rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the
safety of persons on the employer's premises in a unit with other employees ....
Id. § 4117.06(D)(2) (emphasis added).
76. See supra note 70 (footnote 2 of Warren County Sheriff). Note that application of the
Reading principle in Unit 2 results in combining non-deputized corrections officers and non-deputized dispatchers (non-strike employees) with employees in other categories (e.g., a non-deputized
custodial worker) who are not prohibited from striking.
77. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-5-01 (1984). The emergency rule was passed on March 26,
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tion of an exclusive representative may be filed by the exclusive representative or by the employer. For a unit designated by a collective
bargaining agreement entered into prior to April 1, 1984, such petition
may not be filed except during the period of one hundred twenty days to
ninety days before the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement or at any other time during the term of the collective bargaining
agreement if the petition is submitted by mutual agreement of the
parties."8
On the face of it the administrative rule seems to have obvious
aims-interpretation designed to resolve ambiguities (i.e., to clarify)
and relatively minor reshaping of a unit to enlarge or contract the area
of the certified unit by adding or subtracting classifications. Because
petitions to clarify a unit or to amend a certification (i.e., a change in
the unit certified) will lie, according to the terms of the rule, only "in
the absence of a question of representation," it is apparent that subsection (C) petitions were not intended to be a vehicle for major challenges attempting to displace exclusive representatives. This conclusion
is buttressed by the limitation on "standing" in the rule. Note that only
"the exclusive representative" or "the employer" are authorized to petition for clarification or amendment. Arguably, parties to units established by contracts formed after the effective date of the Act could
petition at any time during the contract term. 79 However, in practice, it
soon appeared that parties were attempting to resolve representation
questions by resort to petition under the rule.80 If the issues were not
large, in the sense of implicating all the employees in the unit, at least
they were often substantial. In addition, the parties were calling on the
Board to interpret what the Board had not created or to restructure
units it had not fashioned. A series of cases ultimately developed some
general principles for disposition of petitions for unit clarification or
amendment.
B. Evolution of a Doctrine
1. The Liberty Local School District Case
The petition in the case of Liberty Local School District"1 sought
78. Id. § 4117-5-01(C). The 120 days to 90 days window period was not contained in the
original emergency rule.
79. This conclusion follows from the rule's specification that petitions affecting units under
grandfathered contracts (i.e., executed before April 1, 1984) could be filed only during the window
period, as defined by the second paragraph of § 4117.07(C)(6) and Administrative Code Rule
4117-5-01(C), or by mutual agreement. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(C)(6) (Page Supp.
1984); OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4117-5-01(C) (1984).
80. See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
81. 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 2563 (Apr. 24, 1985).
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clarification of language the parties had negotiated and placed in a
contract executed before the effective date of the Act. The request was
unilateral and not within the window period. 2 These circumstances
took the petition clearly outside Administrative Code Rule 4117-501(C). In addition, however, dictum in the opinion indicated that
SERB was and would be reluctant to interfere with collectively bargained units and especially so when, as in Liberty School District, the
interpretation involved language pre-dating chapter 4117.83 That language did not originate with the Board and, in that sense, was alien to
it.
2.

The University of Cincinnati Hospital Case

The petition for clarification in University of CincinnatiHospital"4
was in fact seeking to effect a substantial representational change. This
was to be achieved by excluding "supervisors, management level employees and/or other confidential employees" 85 from the existing bargaining unit. The unit in question had been bargained into a contract
effective for one year beginning January 20, 1984-a date preceding
the effective date of chapter 4117. The petition was filed during the
window period.8 Thus, the single question for decision was whether the
Board would change the unit on the unilateral petition of one of the
parties, even during the window period. In this connection it is crucial
to the decision that the unit was negotiated between the parties before
the advent of Board authority and that the bargaining representative
was recognized before April 1, 1984. Accordingly, the representative
was "deemed certified" under the temporary law and could not be involuntarily displaced unless, and until, a rival successfully challenged it
with a resulting certification by SERB. 7 Given these conditions, the

82. Id. at VII-324 to -325. The window period is the period of 120 days to 90 days before
the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement. See OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4117-501(C) (1984). For specific statutory language, see supra text accompanying note 78.
83. Liberty School Dist., 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 2563, at VII-324 to -325.
The Board stated:
Unit determinations are matters in which the Board has authority where certification
is sought. But privately bargained units are not reviewed for unlawfulness when certification is not in issue. And it is and will be the Board's general policy not to tamper with a
privately bargained unit during a contract term except by mutual agreement of the parties
or during the window period. This policy stance avoids arbitrary intervention by the state
which is neither a party to the unit agreement nor had a hand in its formulation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
84. 2 OHiO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 2603 (May 22, 1985).
85. Id. at V1l-364.
86. The filing date was October 19, 1984. Id. The contract expired January 19, 1985. Id.
87. See Act of July 6, 1983, § 4(A), 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-245. But cf. id. §
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unit could not be amended. The Board dismissed the petition.8 8
The rationale for this decision is intricate enough to warrant setting it out at some length:
The legislative enactments germane to the issue are plain. The consequences are not so obvious.
A "deemed certified" representative cannot be displaced except by a
competing employee organization. Of course, the exclusive representative
could bargain away part of its exclusiveness but can lose it involuntarily
only as the statute provides. There is one exception to this principle.
That exception is operative when the unit in question combined classifications before April 1, 1984, which could not have been joined after that
date. The strong statutory strictures against the combinations prohibited
in R.C. 4117.06(D)(1)-(6) linked with time limitations in R.C.
4117.05(B), applicable to pre-April 1, 1984, agreements reflect an intent
under specified conditions to limit the contract bar effects of pre-April 1
agreements and also restrict the effectiveness of agreed upon but prohibited job combinations in the same unit. The latter objective may not be
as clear as the intent to restrict the contract bar defense, but it is hardly
conceivable that the legislature intended to proscribe specific job combinations in the same unit (as it obviously did) and at the same time intended to allow those combinations to stand indefinitely simply because
they were negotiated before the effective date of the Act.
If followed, these principles may ultimately place pre-April 1, 1984,
unit combinations of prohibited categories negotiated by "deemed certified" representatives on the same plane with such combinations when
negotiated by post-April 1, 1984, voluntarily recognized or certified exclusive representatives. 8
Why then should not the modification sought here be allowed? The
answer lies in the nature of the changes sought. The present petition
seeks exclusions whose combination with other job categories are not forbidden. Any exclusive representative and employer could negotiate the
combinations in effect in this case without violating the statutory proscriptions. The point is that there is a different legislative intent manifest
where the job classification combinations are not specifically proscribed
as in R.C. 4117.06(D)(l)-(6). For example, there are categories described in R.C. 4117.01, e.g.[,] supervisors, whose inclusion an employer

88. Cincinnati Hosp., 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 2603, at VII-365.
89. This conjecture assumes successful challenges or negotiated changes. A portion of the
statute relevant to these considerations is subsection 4117.08(C)(9). The pertinent part of that
subsection provides:
The employer is not required to bargain on subjects reserved to the management and
direction of the governmental unit except as affect wages, hours, terms and conditions of
employment, and the continuation, modification, or deletion of an existing provision of a
collective bargaining agreement. . . (Emphasis added.)
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C)(9) (Page Supp. 1984)) [original footnote renumbered].
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could successfully resist. This does not mean resistance is imperative. If
the parties mutually agree to bargain for such categories, there is no
legal impediment.90 What is protected against in the case of such categories is compulsion. But, in the present case, because there is by law no
impediment to agreement, the employer must live with its bargain until
the "deemed certified" representative with whom it made the bargain
loses its status by the legislatively ordained method; that is, displacement
by another employee organization under the provisions of R.C. 4117 or
by a new bargain.9 1
3. The Akron Public School Case
In Akron Public School,92 a unilateral petition sought clarification
of an uncertified unit. The unit had been negotiated between the parties after April 1, 1984. Recognition of the exclusive representative was
voluntary. Proceeding on the premise that "[tihere. . . [was] no principled reason for different treatment of unilateral modifications of
'deemed certified' units and 'voluntarily recognized' or 'agreed'
units,"9 3 the design doctrines announced in University of Cincinnati
Hospital and Liberty School District were combined to support dismissal of the petition.94
The evolution of doctrine from Liberty School District through
University of CincinnatiHospital to the Akron Public School decision
resulted in the current policy governing unit clarification and amendment where the Board has had no hand in the shaping of the unit. That
policy is: "No petition for unilateral clarification or amendment in a
'deemed certified,' 'voluntarily recognized,' or 'agreed' unit will be entertained unless made during the window period and directed at the
exclusion of statutorily proscribed classifications." 9 5
VII.

CONCLUSION

Unit design under the Ohio Public Employee Bargaining Act
(Act) 96 has seven conditioning dependencies. These are:
90. See ... City of Canton, [2 OHIO PUB.EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 2439 (1985)] [original
footnote renumbered).
91. Cincinnati Hosp., 2 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 2603, at VII-365 to -366.
92. 2 OHIO PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LRP) 1 2629 (May 22, 1985).
93. Id. at VII-434.
94. The classifications the petitioner wanted to exclude from the unit were ones for which
the statute permitted, but did not compel bargaining. There was no impediment to joinder of the
combinations in one unit. That is, permissible categories, rather than prohibited ones, were joined
with others. Id.
95. Id. The changes sought in Akron Public School were not available under the policy
because no prohibited combinations were involved. See supra note 94.
96. Act of July 6, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-237, 5-238 to -246 (Baldwin)(codified at
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-23 (Page Supp. 1984)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/2

19861

A PRIMER OF UNIT DESIGN

(1) whether the unit in question was negotiated between the parties before the effective date of the Act, April 1, 1984;
(2) whether units negotiated before the effective date of the Act
include absolutely proscribed combinations or merely combinations that
must be avoided unless agreed;
(3) the absolute prohibition against combinations of certain categories in a single unit, e.g., members of a police department with other
employees of the department;
(4) whether the parties agree to bargain for a unit composed of
categories of public employees not "public" within the statutory definition in section 4117.01(A)(2)(1)-(14);
(5) whether procedural prerequisites to the combinations of certain categories of employees (e.g., professional and nonprofessional)
have been satisfied;
(6) whether consents have been secured for grouping in the same
unit of employees of certain elected employers (e.g., more than one
elected county office holder where the holders and board of county
commissioners agree); and
(7) policy considerations testing the propriety of otherwise legal
combinations in the same unit.
Ohio law demands strict attention be given to these conditioning
dependencies before collective bargaining can take place on behalf of
public employees. With adroit handling, however, these principles can
be manipulated (manipulated in the "good" sense of imaginative interpretation) to achieve appropriate units which are both legal and
efficient.
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